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THE QUEST FOR BALANCE IN BAIL: THE NEW SOUTH
WALES EXPERIENCE
R. P. Roulston-
"Bail is a security in the form of a bond required in respect of the re-
lease of an accused person, and conditioned for his appearance at a
specified time and place to answer.the charge. If the terms of a bail
require a surety or sureties, the defendant is placed in custody of such
sureties, who, at common law, could re-seize him." 1
T he right to bail is as old as the law of England itself and it is, as
Lord Devlin has remarked, 2, "indeed curious that fundamental
questions concerning it have never been settled. The system so far has
worked satisfactorily without providing any occasion for their reso-
lution."
This rather complacent view as to the satisfactory operation of the
procedure is not today reflected famong those involved in the adminis-
tration of the bail system. The principles upon which bail should be
granted or refused have been re-examined by the courts and the rela-
tive importance of traditional criteria have been questioned. There is
also evidence of practical concern for the effect upon an accused of
a refusal to grant bail as well as for the possibly harmful effects of the
injudicious granting of bail.
In the ,United States the Vera Foundation's participation in the'Man-
hattan Bail Project in the courts of New York City pioneered a new
approach to the problem of bail. This paved the way for remedial
action against bail abuses elsewhere and similar bail projects have been
started in other communities throughout the United States.3
In England initial examination of the question was undertaken by
the Homfe Office Research Unit's study in 1960.' Further steps have
been taken by "Justice," the British Section of the International Com-
Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law, University of Sydney. LL.B., University of Syd-
ney, 1947; LL.M., University of Tasmania, 1952.
1 ARncmowD, 201, at 76 (24th ed. 1961).
2 DELuN, TnE CRIaINA. PRosEcUTiON IN ENGLAND 71 (24th ed. 1961).
3 See NATioNAL CONFE ENCE O N BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE; PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM
R.PoRr,'Washngton, D. C. (1965).
4 See Ho?= OmcICE RESEARCH Stmy, TIME SEr AwAITIn TRIAL (1960).
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mission of Jurists, by arranging a conference on "Bail and Remands
in Custody" in November 1965, and by setting up a working party.5
In New South Wales there has been recurring criticism of the
operation of the bail system. It was asserted on the one hand that there
were a significant number of cases in which accused citizens were being
unnecessarily deprived of their liberty before being convicted of an
offense, and in some instances, without ultimately being convicted of
an offense, either because bail was refused or set at too high an amount.
On the other hand, it was claimed that the bail system was being abused
by professional criminals in order to prolong their criminal activities
or to evade punishment altogether.
As a result of this disquiet and various other subsidiary, but related,
considerations the Institute of Criminology of the University of Syd-
ney Law School held an important seminar on the bail system in No-
vember 1969, in the hope and expectation that it would encourage
the search for ways to diminish unnecessary remands in custody with-
out impairing the effectiveness of state law enforcement efforts. This
article is based on a paper presented to this seminar by the author which
has been expanded to incorporate ideas and materials raised by other
participants in formal papers and informal discussion.0
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAIL
Bail originated in medieval England as an alternative to holding un-
tried prisoners in custody. Inadequate and disease-ridden jails and
lock-ups and inordinate delays in trials by travelling justices made the
development of some workable alternative to holding accused persons
in pre-trial custody a necessity. There are at least two other principal
theories attributing the origin of present bail procedures to the early
days of the common law. One is the ancient Anglo-Saxon practice of
hostageship whereby one person was held hostage until a promise was
fulfilled by another. The other traces bail to the ancient practice of
"Weregeld"-an assurance to the creditor by a third party that the
debt would be paid.
The system that developed invested the sheriffs with a wide and ill-
defined discretion to release a prisoner on his own promise, or that of an
5 See NEw LAW JoURNAL 195 (December 9th, 1965); NEw LAW JoURNAL 954 (June 16,
1966).6 See PROCEDMINGS OF THE INSTITtE OF CQRMINOLOGY (N.S.W. Government Printing
Office 1969).
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acceptable third person, that he would appear for trial. The third
party surety was personally responsible for the appearance of the ac-
cused. If the accused escaped, the third party surety was originally re-
quired to surrender himself;, thus in effect bail was the bailment or
delivery of the accused to jailers of his own choosing who had custodial
power over him. Later the sureties were permitted to forfeit promised
sums of money instead of themselves if the accused failed to appear.
The first statutory regulation of the granting of bail in England was
by the Statute of Westminster in 1275.' This legislation was designed
to remedy the irresponsible abuse which the sheriffs had made of their
discretion to grant bail. The Statute regulated the discretionary bail
power of sheriffs by specifying which offenses were bailable and which
were not. It listed a series of thirteen types of cases in which persons
should not be bailed and a shorter list of specific situations and offenses
in which bail should not be refused.
These two lists were clearly based on three considerations: (1) the
seriousness of the offenses (e.g., homicide, arson, treason), (2) the like-
lihood of the accused's guilt (e.g., "furtum manifestum," thieves "openly
defamed and known"), and (3) the "outlawed" status of the offender
(e.g., banished, excommunicated or escapees).
Almost certainly these three factors are ultimately derived from the
single consideration of the accused's likelihood of appearing for his trial.
Nevertheless, the first statutory regulation of bail procedures did not
specifically proceed on the basis of one single principle upon which
all decisions about bail should be based. In the centuries that followed
this enactment, emphasis in the reported cases continually fluctuated
from one principle to the other.
For over the next five centuries the Statute of Westminster de-
termined what offenses should be bailable. Until 1826 no basic
changes were made in the principles upon which bail should be granted
or withheld. The intervening statutes, in the main, made changes in the
procedure whereby bail was granted in efforts to eliminate adminis-
trative abuses.
The next important enactment was the Statute of ,1826,8 which
placed emphasis on the principle that bail should rarely be granted
in cases where there was a strong likelihood of conviction; and that
bail should be granted where the prospect of conviction- was small.
7 3 Edw. 1 ch. 15.
87 Geo. IV ch. 64; adopted by N.S.W. in 9.Geo. IV, No. 1.
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By amendment some nine years later,' all previous criteria were sub-
ordinated to the single criterion of the risk that the accused will not
appear to take his trial. This statute appears not to have been adopted
in New South Wales, perhaps not surprisingly if one reflects on the
conditions of the colony of New South Wales in 1835.
The modern origin of the present magisterial discretion in granting
bail rests on the Indictable Offences Act of 1848,0 which in effect
provided that the committing magistrate may in his discretion admit to
bail a person charged with any felony, or with any of a dozen assorted
misdemeanors. In other crimes bail could not be refused. The cardinal
principle upon which this discretion should be exercised was specified:
Such justice of the peace may, in his discretion, admit such person to
bail upon his procuring and producing such surety or sureties as,
in the opinion of such justice, will be sufficient to ensure the appear-
ance of such accused person at the time and place when and where
he is to be tried for such offence.
In New South Wales, this statute is substantially reproduced in sec-
tions 34 and 45 of the Justices Act of 1902. It is more surprising that
the Bail Act of 1898,11 which modified the absolute requirement as to
sureties and gave the magistrates unfettered discretion to admit to bail,
even on his own recognizance, any person whom they have reason to
believe will submit to trial, was not adopted in New South Wales. It
would be of considerable advantage to magistrates in this State if legis-
lation of similar effect, even at this late stage, were enacted.
II. STAGES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
In New South Wales applications for bail may arise at several dif-
ferent levels and stages in the criminal process. There are three main
divisions of criminal courts, namely Courts of Petty Sessions, Courts
of Quarter Sessions and the Supreme Court, each of which has im-
portant powers of granting bail. There is also statutory power given
to police officers to grant bail in certain circumstances. 12 This power
9 5 & 6 Will. IV ch. 33.
10 11 & 12 Vict. ch. 42s. Chapter 23 was adopted in N.S.W. by 14 Vic., No. 43.
1161 & 62 Vict. ch. 7.
12 Justices Act 1902-68 § 153 (1) (N.S.W.):
Any officer of police of or above the rank of inspector, and any officer of
police of or above the rank of firstclass constable in charge of a police station,
and any gaoler shall have the same powers of discharging any person who is in
custody . . . as a Justice has under the provisions of this Act. When any such
[Vol. 5:99
BALANCE IN BAIL
is usually only exercised in minor offenses and when bail is refused in
such circumstances the accused is speedily brought before a court for
determination of bail.
A. Applications for Bail in Courts of Petty Sessions
Courts of Petty Sessions in New South Wales are statutory courts
with purely statutory powers. They exist in prescribed city, urban
and rural areas throughout the State and are presided over by perma-
nent, appointed, legally qualified persons (known as Stipendiary Magis-
trates) who exercise the power vested in "Justices" under the Justices
Act of 1902-68.
The problems involved in the granting or refusing of bail arise pri-
marily in these Courts of Petty Sessions and are a matter of daily oc-
currence in almost all such courts. It is in these courts that persons
charged with offenses usually appear initially. The courts hear charges
of indictable offenses and determine in the first instance whether or
not the accused should be committed to stand trial before a jury.
These courts also deal with a large number of offenses triable sum-
marily and a number of indictable offenses which may be tried sum-
marily only in certain circumstances (e.g., with the accused's consent).
In the Courts of Petty Sessions three different situations commonly
arise and different considerations may be of varying importance in
each situation. Firstly, the accused may be committed to stand his trial
before a superior court and the question of whether or not to grant
bail pending trial arises, or he may have pleaded guilty and been com-
mitted for sentence, thereby raising a similar, but not identical ques-
tion. 8 Secondly, a person may be charged with an indictable.'oiffense,
and the question arises as to how he is to be dealt with pending and
during the preliminary inquiry and examination of witnesses.. Thirdly,
a person may be charged with a summary offense, or an indictable of-
fense triable summarily, and the question arises as to how he is to be
dealt with until the hearings, which may be lengthy and 'protracted,
are completed.
With regard to the first situation it is provided that when a*person
is committed for trial the committing Justice (i.e., Stipendiary- Magis-
officer or gaoler refuses to discharge any such person ... the person shall, if he
so demands be brought before a Justice as soon as practicable, ard the- Justice
shall thereupon hear and determine the matter.
Is justices Act 1902-68, S 51A (N.S.W.).
1970]
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trate) shall either commit him to prison or admit him to jail."4 A
discretion is conferred on the committing Justice whether or not
he shall grant bail in cases of felony, assaults with intent to commit a
felony, attempted felony and certain disparate indictable misdemeanors
(e.g., riot, concealment of the birth of a child). In the case of all other
misdemeanors he shall grant bail.:5 It is to be noted that in both cases
the accused must find a surety or sureties.', This, it is suggested, is an
unnecessarily inflexible requirement and should be repealed. It is not
required in the two other situations previously mentioned.
The second situation entails a less rigid and more satisfactory pro-
cedure. Provision is made for adjournments of the hearing, but in the
interests of the accused, the length of the adjournment shall not ex-
ceed eight days without the accused's consent.' 7 During the adjourn-
ment the accused may, in the court's discretion, be kept in custody or
released on bail with or without sureties.' 8
In the third situation power is conferred on the court to adjourn
without limitation as to time,' 9 and the magistrate may commit the
defendant to custody, release him on bail or suffer him to go at large."0
The words "with or without sureties" do not appear in the Act, thus
the defendant is frequently discharged on his own recognizance and
not uncommonly, without formal order, suffered to go at large. Rarely
is the defendant committed to custody and then it is usually done
in his own interest (e.g., alcoholism, psychiatric disorder).
B. Applications for Bail in Courts of Quarter Session
Courts of Quarter Sessions sit regularly in prescribed cities and
towns throughout New South Wales. They are presided over by a
judge of the district court permanently appointed from members of
the practising Bar. The judge, in exercising criminal jurisdiction, sits as
a Chairman of Quarter Sessions. These courts have wide criminal juris-
diction covering all indictable offenses other than those which, im-
mediately prior to the abolition of the death penalty in 1955, were
'4 Justices Act 1902-68, § 42 (N.S.W.).
15 Justices Act 1902-68, § 45 (N.S.W.).
M Id.
"T Justices Act 1902-68, § 33 (N.S.W.).
s Justices Act 1902-68, S 34 (N.S.W.).
'9 Jusiices Act 1902-68, § 68 (N.S.WV.).
20 Justices Act 1902-68, § 69 (N.S.W.).
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punishable by death."' These latter offenses include murder, rape and
seriously aggravated assaults which are triable in the Supreme Court
sitting in its criminal jurisdiction.
Persons committed to trial at Quarter Sessions by a Court of Petty
Sessions are directed to a named court for a specified session or sitting
of the court. The committing magistrate retains the power of ad-
mitting to bail any person committed for trial who has been commit-
ted to prison; such power may be exercised at any time before the
first sitting of the court at which the accused is to be tried or before
the day to which such sitting is adjourned.2 2 If bail has been refused
by the magistrate, an application may be made to a judge of the Su-
preme Court who may admit the applicant to bail.2-
The Courts of Quarter Sessions, in respect to the offenses within
their jurisdiction, exercise concurrently with the Supreme Court the
power to admit to bail persons who have been committed to, and are
awaiting trial at, Quarter Sessions. This exercise of power is based
predominantly on long accepted practice and as a necessary incident
to the constitution of the court of trial rather than any explicit au-
thority.2 4
Courts of Quarter Sessions frequently entertain applications for bail
by persons awaiting trial before them. In some cases bail has been re-
fused by the committing magistrate or the applicant has failed to seek
bail from the magistrate. In others, the application is in the form of a
request to reduce the amount of bail fixed by the magistrate or to dis-
pense with sureties. These applications are conveniently and character-
istically described as applications to reduce bail but are in the nature
of an application de novo to admit the accused to bail.25 There is very
little formality about such applications. They are frequently made be-
fore a date for trial is fixed but may be made at any time prior to
trial. In exceptional cases bail may be granted over-night during the
21 Crimes Act 1900-69, § 568 (N.S.W.).
22 Justices Act 1902-68, § 46 (N.S.W.). Magistrates other than the committing
magistrate have a more limited power under the same section.'
23 The judge of the Supreme Court who hears the application does so in the exercide
of the inherent jurisdiction received from the courts of Kings Bench in England. See
R. v. Pascoe, 78 W.N. 59 (N.S.W. 1960); R. v. Ladd & 'Murphy, 75 W.N. 431 (N.S.W.
1958). 1 ,
,24 BZt See R. v. Wakefield, 89 .WN. 325 (N.S.W. Pt. '1 1969); ARcTEor, 213 (36th
ed. 1961). '
2 5 R. v. Wakefield, 89 W.N. 325 (N.S.W. Pt. 1 1969) R. t-.. Barrett, 11959] V.L.R.
458.
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trial when,, for example, it is necessary to permit the accused to con-
fer with his counsel regarding complex evidence.
C. Applications for Bail in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, as the highest court in the State of New South
Wales, has a discretionary power inherent in it to grant bail at any
time up to conviction even if it has been refused by a Magistrate, a
Chairman of Quarter Sessions or even another Supreme Court Judge.2
The most common stages of the criminal process at which application
for bail is likely to be made to the Supreme Court are as follows:
(1) After remand by a magistrate and before committal for trial. The
power to grant bail in remand cases should be carefully and sparingly
exercised. At this stage there is little evidence of the probability of
conviction or the likely grounds of defense. If, however, there is to
be a lengthy delay, especially if unreasonable, this may be sufficient
grounds for granting bail. 7 (2) After committal but before commence-
ment of the trial. This is the most common situation in which bail is
requested. Again the powers of the Supreme Court are in addition to
those given to the committing magistrate, which have already been
discussed. The application is in no sense an appeal from the commit-
ting magistrate, but a separate and independent request to exercise an
inherent power. As a matter of law and practice it is exercised without
reference to material other than that before the judge. At this stage
the strength of the prosecution's case is known, the probability of
conviction can be assessed, and the date of trial (always a relevant
consideration) can be ascertained.28 (3) During the adjournment of
h trial. Although the court of trial has power to release an accused
person during an adjournment of the trial, there is a further inherent
power of. bail in the Supreme Court if the trial judge has refused it.2
(4) Pending an appeal against conviction. There is statutory power
for a judge of the Supreme Court to admit to bail a person who, hav-
2 6"The power of the superior courts to bail in all cases whatever, even high treason,
has no history. I do not know, indeed, that it has ever been disputed or modified."
1 STrpura, HISTORY OF THE CRIMANAL LAW 243 (1955). But if refused by one judge
the applicant can go from judge to judge in the hope of a more favorable reception.
R. v. Pascoe, 78 W.N. 59 (N.S.W. 1960).1 27R.'v., Ladd & Murphy, 75 W.N. 431 (N.S.W. 1955); R. v. Cable, 63 W.N. 267
(N.S.W. 1946).
298R. *v. Watson, 64 W.N.'100 (N.S.W. 1947).
2 R. v. Greenham, [19401 V.L.R. 236.
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ing been convicted, has appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal.30
The pertinent section of the Criminal Appeal Act does not mention
"exceptional circumstances," but it has been held that bail will, in
this situation, only be granted in exceptional circumstances because
"the guilt of the accused has been established by the verdict of a jury
in what must be taken, until the contrary be shown to be a trial prop-
erly conducted without error of law." 31
Having considered the various stages of the criminal process at
which the question of granting or refusing bail may have to be con-
sidered by the courts, we now turn to the various criteria that gov-
ern the answer to this question. The importance and relative weight to
give to each of the following criteria will, of course, differ at various
times of the judicial process as will the nature and effect of the ma-
terial before the court.
III. THE CRITRIA FOR GRANTING BAIL
A. Non-Appearance at Trial
An examination of the authorities and the statutes show that the
most consistently followed and enunciated consideration when deal-
ing with the question of whether bail should be refused is that the
object of bail is to secure by a pecuniary penalty the appearance of the
prisoner at his trial. This consideration has been frequently and em-
phatically restated over at least the last one hundred years. In R. v.
Scaife12 Mr. Justice Coleridge remarked:
I conceive that the principle on which persons are committed to prison
by magistrates, previous to trial, is for the purpose of ensuring the
certainty of their appearing to take trial. It seems to me that the same
principle is to be acted on in an application for bailing a person
committed to take his trial, and it is not a question of the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner. It is on that count alone that it becomes
important to see whether the offence is serious, whether the evidence
is strong, and whether the punishment for the offence is heavy.33
80 CRtmnAL AzL, Acr S§ 18(2), 22 (N.S.W. 1912).
31R. v. Southgate, 78 W.N. 44 (N.S.W. 1961).
32 10 L.J.M.C. 144 (1841).
33See also R. v. Robinson 23 L.J.Q.B. 286 (1854); R. v. Barronet & Allain [1852]
Dears. C.C. 51.
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In R. v. Rose34 Lord Russell expressed a similar view:
It cannot be too strongly impressed upon the magistracy of the
country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the
requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the
prisoner at trial.
Recently, in two New South Wales decisions, similar opinions were
expressed. In one decision the Court noted:
The object of bail is to ensure and secure the attendance of the ac-
cused at his trial and it recognises that the liberty of the subject
should only be restricted in such ways as will achieve this result.85
In another decision the Court stated:
But it is, I think, important to keep in mind that the grant or refusal
of bail is determined fundamentally on the probability or otherwise
of the applicant appearing at Court as and when required and not
on his supposed guilt or innocence. 36
Although the sentiment in this passage has been echoed in countless
other decisions, the courts, over the years, have found it necessary to
articulate and elaborate a number of other factors which should be
taken into consideration. What has been described as "the prima facie
right to bail" may be displaced by a variety of other considerations.
B. Seriousness of the Offense
The seriousness of the offense has been established as an important
matter to be taken into consideration when assessing the likelihood that
an accused will appear at his trial.
In charges of murder the relationship between the seriousness of the
offense and the granting of bail comes into the sharpest focus. It is
abundantly clear that it would be most unusual to grant bail to a per-
son against whom there exists a prima facie case of murder. For ex-
ample, in R. v. Barronet & Allain, 7 Mr. Justice Erle giving the deci-
sion of the court said:
Thus then it appears that the crime charged is of the highest magni-
34 18 Cox C.C. 717 (1898).
35 R. v. Appleby, 83 W.N. 300, 301 (N.S.W. Pt. 1 1966).
.6 R. v. Mahoney-Smith, 2 N.S.W.R. 154 (1967).
37 [1852] Dears C.C. 51.
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tude, the punishment of it assigned by law of the extreme severity and
the evidence of guilt a confession; under such circumstances the court
is bound to presume that no amount of bail would secure the pres-
ence of the accused at the trial should they be liberated.
It is questionable, however, in cases of murder, whether an accused
should be admitted to bail or even in such cases where the seriousness
of the offense should stand as an absolute principle in its own right.
In R. v. Cable,3 Mr. Justice Herron granted bail to a person charged
with murder who had been remanded in custody until the coronial
inquiry which was to take place a month after the alleged offense. His
Honor stated:
In this case, however, there is nothing before me except the bare
fact that the accused is charged with murder, and it seems to me that,
unless I have some evidence before me to show that he is likely to
abscond or fail to answer his bail by the time the coronial enquiry
comes on, it is wrong in principle that he should be held for such a
length of time. I cannot be taken as saying for one moment that an
application for bail on a charge of murder must be granted upon
being made. Far from it.
C. Probability of Conviction
The strength of the Crown's case and the apparent probability of
conviction is a matter-particularly if allied with other matters-which
will make the granting of bail more difficult than in a case where
the evidence appears weak and conviction appears improbable.3 9
The presumption of innocence or the principle that a man is pre-
sumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty would seem to operate
rather weakly where the court, on a bail application, is making an as-
sessment of the probability of conviction. This may be inevitable as
the court is entitled to consider the nature of the evidence which the
Crown proposes to present in order to rebut the presumption of in-
nocence and may be faced with real difficulty in adequately assessing
the strength of the defense, which, at this stage, may not have been
revealed at all. In R. v. Ladd,4° the court regretted that in the circum-
stances of that case
8 63 W.N. 267 (N.S.W. 1946).
S_9R. v. Montgomery, 75 W.N. 233 (N.S.W. 1958); R. v. Clancy, 75 W.N. 142
(N.S.W. 1958).
4075 W.N. 431, 433 (N.S.W. 1958).
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The court is not able at this stage of the matter to assess on exami-
nation of the depositions before the magistrate what are the prob-
abilities as to conviction of the crimes charged or what defences the
accused persons may have and what are the probabilities of their suc-
cess on those defences.
D. Severity of Punishment
The severity of the punishment is inextricably interrelated to the
seriousness of the offense as well as to the accused's previous criminal
record.
If it appears that the offense charged is one of some gravity, the
evidence against the accused looks overwhelming, and he has an ex-
tensive criminal record, there are obviously strong inducements for
him to flee if granted bail. It then becomes increasingly unlikely that,
if granted bail, he will appear to stand his trial. In these cases the
refusal to grant bail would usually be justified on what, as previously
submitted, is the basic reason for refusing bail. The materiality of this
consideration, along with others, has frequently been adverted to. In
R. v. Montgomery,4' the court remarked:
The subject charges are very serious involving heavy penalties. The
evidence, apart from the alleged admissions of guilt, is very strong
against him-in fact, he was caught red-handed. He has every reason
to fear a conviction and, if convicted, a long sentence. In the cir-
cumstances it seems to me that the applicant has every incentive to
abscond if granted bail.
In R. v. Clancy42 it was stated:
The offence with which he is charged is a very serious one and it
carries a maximum penalty of ten years' penal servitude. The evidence
against the applicant also is very strong and in my opinion it is very
likely that he will be convicted of it. In view of these facts and the
fact that there are other serious charges pending aaginst him, it seems
to me that the applicant has every reason to abscond should he be
given the opportunity.
E. Previous Record and Likelihood of Committing Further Offenses
In contemporary times it would appear that the most important factor
4175 W.N. 233, 234 (N.S.W. 1958).
42 75 W.N. 142, 143 (N.S.W. 1958).
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justifying the refusal of bail is a combination of a previous criminal
record and the consequent likelihood that the accused will commit
further offenses if released on bail. This consideration seems to have
become deeply entrenched in the practice of granting bail in both
England and New South Wales although its standing in other juris-
dictions is less certain. 3
It is generally recognized that a sizable minority of crimes-par-
ticularly those involving dishonesty-are committed by persons who
are currently on bail. It is also recognized that persons with a long
criminal history of these crimes involving dishonesty will very prob-
ably commit further crimes if they are released on bail. This fact was
recognized in R. v. Phillips,4 where the court noted:
Some crimes are not at all likely to be repeated pending trial and in
those cases there may be no objection to bail; but some are, and
housebreaking particularly is a crime which will very probably be
repeated if a prisoner is released on bail, especially in the case of a
man who has a record of housebreaking such as the applicant has.
In R. v. Armstrong45 it was stated:
It is clear that it is the duty of the justices to inquire into the ante-
cedents of the man who is applying to them for bail, and if they
find he has a bad record-particularly, a record which suggests that
he is likely to commit similar offences while on bail-that is a matter
which they must consider before granting bail.
The remarks of Mr. Chief Justice Goddard in H.M. Postmaster-
General v. Whitehouse" have frequently been cited with approval in
New South Wales. In R. v. Pascoe,47 R. v. Prentice,48 and R. v.
Clancy,4 the court reiterated:
As we have pointed out in cases in the Court of Criminal Appeal,
bail ought to be sparingly granted in cases where prisoners have long
records of conviction, since it very often results when such a 'person
obtains bail, he commits offences while on bail, sometimes telling
the court afterwards that he committed them so as. to get money to
43 See, e.g., R. v. Alexander [1956] VL.R. 451; R. v. Harrison' [1950] V.L.R. 20.
4432 Crim. App. 47-48 (1947).
45 All E.R. 219 (1951).
46 35 Crim. App. 8, 11 (1952).
4778 W.N. 59 (N.S.W. 1961).
48 74 W.N. 440 (N.S.W. 1957).
4975 W.N. 142 (N.S.W. 1958).
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enable him to be represented at quarter sessions, in other cases say-
ing that he had to make some provision for his wife and children while
he was in prison.50
Similar sentiments were expressed colorfully and forcefully by Mr.
Justice Isaacs in two recent cases, R. v. Appleby & Anor,5' and R. v.
Young.52 In the former he said:
Save in very special circumstances persons committed for trial who
during such committals commit serious offences against the com-
munity cannot hope to be liberated on bail once these latter offences
have been prima facie established and there has been a committal in
respect of them. Magistrates are only doing their duty towards the
community in stamping out crime and the opportunities for further
crime by refusing bail in those circumstances.
And in the latter case he remarked:
But it is timely to sound a note of warning. I have already dealt with
bail applications by persons who between committal by magistrates
and the hearing at Quarter Sessions commit like offences . . . Let it
not be thought that people can at early stages, that is, in between
remands before magistrates, commit like offences with impunity, that
is, safe and secure in the knowledge that they can nevertheless get bail
on such new charges and still retain their bail on the pending charges.
Let it be clearly understood that the honeymoon is on the way
out and their conduct is likely to be viewed as a calculated risk and
such conduct is likely to imperil their liberty, and may well lead to
refusal and revocation of bail.
Judge Cross in R. v. Wakefield53 considered this matter of granting
bail to prisoners with previous criminal convictions "of very great im-
portance" and said:
Accused persons have in fact claimed at Quarter Sessions that they
committed these crimes to raise money for legal representation.
Others were no doubt influenced by the "rule" in R. v. Lovely4
which was said to prohibit more than one accumulative sentence. As
a result, crimes were frequently committed by persons on bail with-
out fear of any proportionate penalty. But, whatever the causes,
50 See note 46 supra.
5183 W.N. 300, 302 (N.S.W. 1966).
52 83 W.N. 391, 395 (N.S.W, 1966).
53 86 W.N. 325, 332 (N.S.W. 1969).
4 56 Wr.N. 75 (N.S.W. 1939).
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judges of the Court are confronted time and again with the situa-
tion where offences-often a multiplicity of them-are committed
by persons at a time when they were currently on bail.
Without minimizing the seriousness of the incidence of crimes com-
mitted by persons on bail the recognition of the principle that it is en-
tirely proper and defensible to refuse bail, and remand a person in.
custody on the basis that he may commit further offenses if he be
released on bail, raises important questions of both practical imple-
mentation and principle.
Two practical considerations that need to be carefully considered
are (1) the available criminal statistics provide no adequate or safe
guide to the number of persons who do commit crimes while on bail
or the number and types of crimes they commit, and (2) there has
not yet been developed any reasonably satisfactory predictive method
for determining which prisoners are, in fact, certainly or very likely,
going to commit further offenses. It is doubtful that the criteria upon
which the police make their assessments, are the same as those which
guide the court.
The court, no doubt; would know, in general terms, that a person
who has been shown to have patent criminal tendencies will be more
likely to commit further crimes. The evidence as to recidivism indi-
cates that the probability of reconviction becomes steadily greater with
each new conviction. The court, in light of this, is likely to be guided
by the length of the record and the seriousness of the offense.
The police, on the other hand, may place greater emphasis on in-
formation in their possession not then available to the court, and the
desirability of having the defendant out of the way, but nevertheless
readily available while they complete their inquiries without the risk
of interferences with witnesses and obsfruction of their investigation.
They are also likely to be more acutely-:c6nscious of the fact that if
further offenses are committed the onerous biirderis of investigation and
apprehension will fall squarely on their shoulders.
*There -is also a serious ofijection in prifciple- to remanding a person
in custody'on the grouind that he may comrnmt otiher offenses if released
on bail. The right of a person, not yet- convicted, to his liberty is a
most important consideration. What Lord Atkin in Liversidge v.- A
derson55 described as "one of the pillars of lierty" was that ""it engls"h
GG3 AIIE.R. 339 (1941). ', " . -
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law every imprisonment is prima facie unlawful and that it is for
the person directing imprisonment to justify his act." The objection
was expressed in Everett v. Ribband-5 as being
[C]ontrary to all principle for a man to be punished not for what he
has already done but for what he may thereafter do.
This view is accepted in the United States where judges are not
authorized to refuse pre-trial bail as a device for the protection of so-
ciety from possible new crimes by the accused. Mr. Justice Jackson
justified this attitude in Williamson v. United States in these terms:
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsum-
mated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught
with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it
even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction
of such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
While recognizing that the possibility of the commission of further
offenses, interfering with witnesses, and other matters which hamper
police investigation are the most difficult factors to deal with that
arise on the question of bail, it is manifestly undesirable that the
principle of salus populi suprema lex be too readily invoked or al-
lowed to obscure the fundamental principle that the object of bail
is to secure attendance of the accused at his trial. The very existence
of the device of bail recognizes that the liberty of the subject should
only be restricted in such a way as will achieve this result.
F. The Public Interest in the Right of the Accused to Be Free to
Prepare His Defense
One of the most interesting recent developments in the principles
and practices relating to bail has been the assertion that the most im-
portant consideration in bail applications is that in the public interest,
it is most desirable that the accused be allowed his freedom so that
his case may be prepared in the best possible circumstances.
This view has been most fully developed by Judge Cross sitting as
Chairman of Quarter Sessions in R. v. Wakefield,58 and because of its
relative novelty warrants thorough analysis:
5 1 All E.R. 823 (1952).
57 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950).
68 86 W.N. 325, 326 (N.S.W. 1969).
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In considering whether bail should be granted it seems to me that
the most important consideration is the public interest in the right
of any person to have his case presented in the fairest possible cir-
cumstances. In criminal cases the accused is entitled to equal-no less
and no more-consideration to that given to the Crown. The Crown
law officers with the sizable, if not unlimited resources, of the At-
torney-General's Department, are able to prepare the prosecution with
thoroughness and at leisure, and generally, without finding them-
selves under great difficulties in the interviewing of witnesses, the
obtaining of further evidence or the like.
Prima facie it is desirable that the preparation of the defence be al-
lowed to take place in circumstances of approximate parity with
those in which the prosecution is prepared. There are obvious forensic
advantages in the accused's legal adviser interviewing the accused.
And because it is desirable that the legal adviser have as many inter-
views with the accused as he considers beneficial to the conduct of
the accused's case, it is desirable that the legal adviser have ready
access to the accused, i.e. that the accused be readily available for
such interviews. It can be seen therefore, that the proper conduct
of the accused's case involves the proper presentation of it, which
in turn involves the ready accessibility of the accused to his legal
adviser which can best be achieved if the accused is at liberty and
cannot be best achieved if the accused is confined at the State Peni-
tentiary...
This statement of principle merits close consideration not only because
of its refreshing novelty or because it has been a previously neglected
factor, but also because of the explicit and tacit assumptions under-
lying it. To say that it is novel is perhaps to overstate the position.
It is a factor that has from time to time been mentioned in cases
usually in the context of whether the defense to be raised is simple
or complex. Preparation of a complicated defense, even with the aid
of experienced solicitors, may be very difficult if the accused man can
be seen only in prison.
In the past, little consideration was given to cases with apparently
straightforward defenses or ones in which the accused intended to
plead guilty. In the leading case of R. v. Vatson," the court, after
considering the three main tests as to the probability of the accused
appearing at his trial, i.e. the nature of the crime charged, the prob-
69 64 W.N. 100 (N.S.W. 1947).
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ability of conviction, and the severity of punishment, went on to list
eight other circumstances that may be relevant in appropriate cases,
but were not matters to outweigh the general rules enunciated. The
last of these considerations was the following:
[T]he fact that the accused might be prejudiced in the preparation
of the defence might also have some weight, but the case would
need to be an exceptional one.
It remains to be seen to what extent these propositions will find gen-
eral acceptance. They are supported to some extent by the opinion ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Sholl in R. v. Light6° that he was not prepared
to subscribe to the view expressed in R. v. Watson as to the relative
unimportance of the accused's liberty to prepare his defense. In Tas-
mania, Light has been preferred to Watson.6
It is beyond question that the accused should, as a matter of policy,
be placed as nearly as possible in a position of parity with the prose-
cution in the preparation of his defense. It must also be recognized
that many accused persons have, in fact, no legal representation at any
stage of the proceedings. If the public interest demands that it is the
right of every person to have his case presented in the fairest possible
circumstances, much remains to be done to make this right a reality.
To even move effectively in this direction there would need to be a
major expansion of legal aid at both trial and pre-trial levels. Until
the resources available to the accused in all cases approximate those
of the Attorney General's Department, the argument that the liberty
of the accused to prepare his defense is the primary consideration in
bail applications becomes unsatisfactory in the many cases of unrepre-
sented defendants.
Judge Cross was clearly correct when he observed in Wakefield
that the same principles apply both to a person who has been com-
mitted for sentence only and to a person who has been com-
mitted for trial. Although bail will only be granted in exceptional
cases where a person has pleaded guilty before a court of competent
jurisdiction and been remanded before it for sentence, the position
under Section 51A of the Justices Act of 1902-68 is in no way
comparable. That section was designed to expedite the hearing of pleas
and ease an administrative burden and in such cases:
60 [1954] V.L.R. 152.
61 R. v. Fisher, [1964] Tasm. Rep. 7.
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The same principles should be followed as apply where an enquiry
has been held, a prima facie case has been made out, and the accused
has been committed for trial. The section was not intended to affect the
position of an accused person in any manner prejudicial to him.0 2
G. Delay in Court Hearing
The question as to how long the accused may be kept in custody
awaiting trial is another factor which must be considered. This is
largely dependent on the degree of hardship in each case. If the
period.is substantial, the grounds for refusing bail must be strong:
If it is a long period, particularly if it appears to be an unreasonably
long period, that might furnish a very good ground for the granting
of bail 0 3
Here the accused's previous record may also be of some relevance
in considering the hardship that custody may inflict. Confinement in
prison may impose lesser hardship upon a person who has suffered
previous periods of imprisonment than on a man who has not.
It is relevant to determine whether delay has been occasioned by
the accused or his legal advisers, or whether through no fault of the
accused or his legal advisers the refusal of bail will result in the lengthy
detention of the accused."
Other and more difficult considerations may arise in cases before
magistrates where they may have to decide questions of bail before a
prima facie case is developed. Although the period that is allowed for
remands for the purpose of further presentation of evidence is sub-
ject to statutory control, the question remains: How long should a
person be kept in custody without even a prima facie case existing
against him?
Lord Devlin made this interesting observation on the question:
*. . [U]ntil a prima facie case is made out against the accused to the
satisfaction of the magistrate, he is being detained simply because the
police believe him to be guilty; a magistrate who remands after for-
mal evidence of arrest is holding him in custody simply because the
police say he is guilty and for no better reason. To the extent to
which this is done, and it is quite frequently done, can it not be said
62R. v. Pallister, (unreported) (N.S.W. Sup. Ct. 1959).
,a6R. v. Pet, noted in 75 W.N. 434 (N.S.W. 1957). See also R. v. Ladd, 75 W.N.
431 (N.S.W. 1958); R. v. Cable, 63 W.N. 267 (N.S.W. 1946).
04 See R. v. Wakefield, 86 W.N. 325, 331 (N.S.W. 1969).
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that people in England are detained merely on police suspicion. That
could be said if there were any substantial number of cases in which
the police subsequently failed to obtain a committal. But there is not.
No doubt if there were magistrates would be more cautious about
exercising their power of remand on formal evidence, and the defence
would object to such adjournments much more frequently than it
does .... 65
H. Other Relevant Factors
Although the above matters appear to be the major considerations
involved in determining whether or not bail should be granted they
are by no means exhaustive. Other factors that are generally con-
sidered, depending on the nature of the case, include the accused's
economic position, his employment record, if employed, how long
in his present employment and if unemployed, how long unemployed
and why; his marital status and the state of his family; his local
reputation; his state of health; and the fact that the prosecution has,
or has not, opposed the application.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic from the above discussion that the quest for balance
in the granting of bail is a complex task. There is uncertainty as to the
relative importance of the various relevant criteria. There is doubt as
to what weight is to be given to each of them at different stages of
the pre-trial process. There are differences of opinion as to which of
these criteria can properly be regarded as principles in their own right
justifying the refusal of bail. It is important that these considerations be
clarified and made more explicit so as to minimize doubts as to the
validity of the basis upon which any particular bail application is
refused.
c5 DVLIN, THz CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 78 (1960).
